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MUTUALLY-BENEFICIAL REPATRIATION
AGREEMENTS:
RETURNING CULTURAL PATRIMONY,
PERPETUATING THE ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES
MARKET
Stacey Falkoff *
INTRODUCTION
“I began to reflect: What’s the best way out?”—Phillipe De
Montebello, director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art
in New York, explaining that he only became interested in
negotiating with the Italian government for the return of
antiquities when he concluded that the issue “would not go
away.”1
A flush of repatriation claims brought in the past two years
against several American museums has drawn much attention to
extrajudicial mutually beneficial repatriation agreements
(“MBRAs”) as an answer to cultural property disputes. The stage
was set in February 2006, when the Republic of Italy and the
Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York (the “Met”) entered
into a reciprocity that has been hailed as a “landmark agreement”2

* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2008; B.A. McGill University, 2003.
Thanks to my mom and dad for their unyielding love, encouragement, and
support. Thanks also to the members of the Journal of Law and Policy Editorial
Board for their editing assistance.
1
Randy Kennedy & Hugh Eakin, Met Chief, Unbowed, Defends Museum’s
Role, N.Y. T IMES, Feb. 28, 2006, at E1.
2
Sharon Flescher, News and Updates, 8 IFAR J. 4 (2005/06).
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and a “blueprint for future negotiations with other museums that
own artifacts with . . . disputed provenance[s].”3 The Met agreed
to return twenty-one likely looted and illegally exported artifacts to
Italy in three installments over a four-year period,4 and, in
exchange, the Italian Ministry of Culture (hereinafter referred to as
“Italy”) promised the Met long-term loans5 of works of
“equivalent importance and beauty.”6
Not long after this prominent MBRA, in April 2006, the
director of the Boston Museum of Fine Arts (the “BMFA”)
traveled to Italy to engage in similar discussions regarding the
provenance of certain objects that the museum purchased between
the early 1970s and the late 1990s.7 Six months later, the BMFA
and the Italian government entered into an analogous agreement,
whereby the museum voluntarily returned thirteen Greek and
Roman antiquities to the Italian government,8 and Italy promised to
lend the BMFA works for two upcoming exhibitions.9
This trend continued in July 2006, when the J. Paul Getty
3

Elisabetta Povoledo, Italy Makes its Choices of Antiquities to Lend Met,
N.Y. T IMES, Mar. 15, 2006, at E2.
4
Flescher, supra note 2. These works included the Euphronios krater,
purchased by the Met in 1972 for $1 million, and the Morgantina Collection,
consisting of fifteen pieces purchased in two lots in 1981 and 1982 for $2.75
million. Andrew L. Slayman, The Trial in Rome, ARCHAEOLOGY, Feb. 6,
2006, http://www.archaeology.org/online/features/italytrial/index.html.
5
Under Italian law, state museums may loan works to foreign institutions
for a maximum of three years. Kurt G. Siehr, Globalization and National
Culture: Recent Trends Toward a Liberal Exchange of Objects, 38 VAND . J.
TRANSNAT ’ L L. 1067, 1094 (2005).
6
Elisabetta Povoledo, Met to Sign Accord in Italy to Return Vase and
Artifacts, N.Y. T IMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at E2.
7
Ralph Frammolino & Jason Felch, Boston Museum Returns 13
Antiquities to Italy, L.A. T IMES, Sept. 29, 2006, at A4. These included a
marble statue dating back to A.D. 136, a candelabrum, ancient Greek water jugs,
and classical vessels, for which the BMFA paid a total of $834,000. Peter
Popham, US Museum Returns Looted Antiquities as Italians Stand up for Lost
Heritage and Pride, T HE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 1, 2006, at 55.
8
Popham, supra note 7.
9
Pursuant to the agreement, the Italian Culture Ministry will lend
antiquities to the BMFA for upcoming exhibits about Renaissance Venice and
artistic treasures from Naples. Frammolino & Felch, supra note 7.
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Museum in Los Angeles (the “Getty”) announced that it would
return a sixth-century gold funerary relief and a fourth-century
grave marker purchased in 1955 and 1993, respectively, alleged to
have been illegally exported from Greece.10 The Minister of Culture
for the Hellenic Republic issued a formal statement several months
later, indicating that, in exchange, “the Ministry [will] work with
the Getty . . . to establish a broad framework for cultural
cooperation in areas of common interest, including loans of
important artifacts and periodical exhibitions.”11 Most recently, in
July 2007, after more than three years of negotiations, the Getty
agreed to return forty prized artifacts to Italy,12 including a lifesized statue of Aphrodite dating from the 5th century B.C., a
sculpture called “Griffons Attacking a Fallen Doe,” and a statue of
Apollo.13 In exchange, Italy promised to drop civil charges against
the Getty’s former curator of antiquities, Marion True, who is
accused of trafficking looted art.14 Additionally, Italy agreed to
allow the museum to keep the sculpture of Aphrodite until 2010,
and the parties resolved to establish a “heightened level of
cooperation [with one another,] enabling them to borrow each
others’ artworks . . . far more liberally than in the past.”15
Willingness on the part of American museums to repatriate
artifacts without legal mandates is not unprecedented,16 and
10

Hugh Eakin, Getty Museum Agrees to Return Two Antiquities to Greece,
N.Y. T IMES, July 11, 2006, at E1.
11
Press Release, Hellenic Republic Ministry of Culture and the J. Paul
Getty Trust Issue Joint Statement (Dec. 11, 2006), http://www.getty.edu/
news/press/center/statement06_getty_greek_joint_release_121106.html.
12
Jason Felch & Ari Bloomekatz, Getty’s Accord Removes Shadow; The
Specter of Recent Scandals is Starting to Lift from the Museum and its
Programs on News of an Agreement to Return Antiquities to Italy, L.A. T IMES,
Aug. 3, 2007, at B1.
13
Returning Stolen Treasure, T HE CANBERRA T IMES, Aug. 11, 2007, at
A8.
14
Felch & Bloomekatz, supra note 12.
15
Returning Stolen Treasure, supra note 13.
16
For example, in 1996, the Met returned two illuminated palm-leaf
manuscript folios to Calcutta. Norman Palmer, Statutory, Forensic and Ethical
Initiatives in the Recovery of Stolen Art and Antiquities, in THE RECOVERY OF
STOLEN ART 9 (Norman Palmer ed., 1998). In 1996, “the Court of the First

F ALKOFF F INAL A UTHORIZATION 2. DOC

268

11/26/07 2:09 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

repatriation resulting from deals struck between art-rich source
nations and museums is hardly novel.17 Nevertheless, the
repatriation movement is steadily gaining momentum,18 as both
public notions of propriety evolve and as art-rich nations gain a
greater awareness of “the dual scientific and economic justifications
for expending resources to recover their plundered past[s].”19 The
accords reached in the last year suggest that MBRAs are likely to
become the new protocol for resolving cultural property
disputes. 20
Instance of Genoa in Italy ordered the restitution of 87 archaeological pieces to
Ecuador, and in 2000, 59 pre-Colombian artifacts were returned to Peru from
Canada. UNESCO Home Page, http://portal.unesco.org (follow “Culture”
hyperlink; then follow “Normative Action” hyperlink; then follow “Heritage”
hyperlink; then follow “Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return
of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in case of Illicit
Appropriation” hyperlink; then follow “Information Kit on Restitution”
hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).
17
For example, in 1974, the Norton Simon Museum in Los Angeles
agreed to return a statue of the Natarja to India. In return, India promised to
withdraw its lawsuit against the museum, to allow the museum to retain the
statue for ten years before its official return, and to lend the museum other
objects in the near future. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, A LBERT E. ELSEN &
STEPHEN K. URICE, LAW , ETHICS AND THE V ISUAL ARTS 340 (5th ed., Kluwer
Law Int’l 2007) (1979). In 1986, the M.H. de Young Memorial Museum in San
Francisco agreed to repatriate 35 pre-Colombian murals to Mexico after reaching
a bilateral agreement with the Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia
concerning their “custody, conservation, and exhibition.” JEANETTE
GREENFIELD , T HE RETURN OF CULTURAL TREASURES 269 (2d ed. 1996).
18
John Alan Cohan, An Examination of Archaeological Ethics and the
Repatriation Movement Respecting Cultural Property (Part Two), 28
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & P OL ’ Y J. 1, 6 (2004).
19
Michael J. Kelly, Conflicting Trends in the Flourishing International
Trade of Art and Antiquities, 14 D ICK. J. I NT ’ L L. 31, 45 (1995).
20
Reni Gertner, Litigators of the Lost Art: Museums to Avoid Lawsuits
over Antiquities by Proof of Their Provenances, MISSOURI LAWYERS W EEKLY,
Aug. 28, 2006, at NEWS; see also Robert K. Paterson, The “Caring and
Sharing” Alternative: Recent Progress in the International Law Association to
Develop Draft Cultural Material Principles, 12 INT ’ L J. OF CULTURAL PROP.
62, 65 (2005) (“While . . . there have been some instances of refusal to consider
requests for the return of sensitive cultural material to its place of origin, far more
common have been instances of some sort of compromise solution.”).
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While recognizing that MBRAs have the potential to confer
distinct benefits, this Note will argue that they are nonetheless
undesirable. Part I will lay the foundation for the discussion by
providing an overview of the problem of the illicit antiquities
market, as well as the fundamental arguments proffered in support
of repatriation. Part II will examine the MBRA reached between
the Met and Italy last year, acknowledging both the primary and
subsidiary benefits that MBRAs can yield. Part III will then
assume a more global perspective, revealing that, unfortunately,
MBRAs inadvertently encourage museums to continue to acquire
objects of questionable provenance and detract from the formation
of much-needed legal precedent in the field. Part III will
additionally provide an analysis of the hurdles and general
uncertainties that source nations face when they seek to repatriate
their cultural property under international law. By juxtaposing the
benefits and drawbacks of MBRAs, this Note will demonstrate
that, while MBRAs may eventually provide an ideal means for
resolving cultural property disputes, their use at this point only
functions to ensure the continuance of the black market.
I.

BACKGROUND
A. The Need to Curb the Illicit Antiquities Market

The illicit antiquities trade is thriving.21 Attaching a precise
financial value to such a secretive trade is difficult, but it is
frequently purported to be second only to drug trafficking in the

21

Lisa J. Borodkin, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Proposed
Legal Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV . 377, 382 (1995) (“International
antiquities smuggling has become an epidemic, affecting Europe, the Middle
East, Africa, Asia, Latin America, North America, and virtually every nation.”);
see also Patty Gerstenblith, Acquisition and Deacquisition of Museum
Collections and the Fiduciary Obligations of Museums to the Public, 11
CARDOZO J. INT ’ L & COMP. L. 409, 446 (2003) (“The problem of antiquities
looted directly from archaeological excavations is now recognized as one of
considerable monetary magnitude and of worldwide scope.”).
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hierarchy of lucrative underground markets.22 From 1972 to 1990,
its profits are said to have doubled from one billion to two billion
dollars, 23 and recent studies estimate that the trade currently
generates approximately six billion dollars per year.24 While
thousands of artifacts enter the trade every day, 25 recovery
prospects remain bleak. Only between five to ten percent of
objects that are illegally excavated and/or exported in contravention
of national patrimony and national export laws are recovered.26
Moreover, the average recovery of such illicit antiquities is
estimated to be a slow 13.4 years.27 The vast majority of these
objects eventually enters the legitimate art market.28
Realistically, a number of factors render it improbable that the
illicit antiquities trade will ever cease to exist:29 Discrepancies
22

Jane Warring, Underground Debates: The Fundamental Differences of
Opinion that Thwart UNESCO’s Progress in Fighting the Illicit Trade in
Cultural Property, 19 EMORY INT ’ L L. R EV . 227, 234 (2005).
23
Julia A. McCord, The Strategic Targeting of Diligence: A New
Perspective in Stemming the Illicit Trade in Art, 70 I ND. L.J. 985, 986 (1995).
24
David N. Chang, Stealing Beauty: Stopping the Madness of Illicit Art
Trafficking, 28 HOUS. J. INT’ L L. 829, 832 (2006). The trade largely operates
with tomb robbers searching out these artifacts, and selling them to middlemen,
who enjoy significant profits when they resell the works to private buyers or
institutions. Sue J. Park, The Cultural Property Regime in Italy: An
Industrialized Nation’s Difficulties in Retaining and Recovering its Antiquities,
23 U. PA . J. I NT ’ L ECON. L. 931, 931 (2002).
25
See Chauncey D. Steele IV, The Morgantina Treasure: Italy’s Quest for
the Repatriation of Looted Artifacts, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’ L L. REV . 667,
683 (2000).
26
Sarah S. Conley, International Art Theft, 13 W IS. INT ’ L L.J. 493, 493
n.6 (1995). National patrimony laws vest ownership of all cultural property of a
particular age in the state, including that which has not yet been discovered.
National export laws generally restrict the export of cultural objects. Jessica Eve
Morrow, The National Stolen Property Act and the Return of Stolen Cultural
Property to its Rightful Owners, 30 B.C. I NT ’ L & COMP. L. REV . 249, 252
(2007).
27
Chang, supra note 24.
28
Christa L. Kirby, Stolen Cultural Property: Available Museum
Responses to an International Dilemma, 104 DICK . L. REV . 729, 730–31
(2000).
29
See Chang, supra note 24.
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between national laws can be used to launder works of tainted
title;30 the physical dimensions of the objects often allow them to
be easily removed from their countries and resold; and the nature of
the antiquities market31 espouses secrecy as the norm for both
legitimate and illegitimate international transactions.32 In addition,
notwithstanding the enormous profits the trade yields,
corresponding criminal penalties are relatively mild, and certainly
serve as less of a deterrent than those associated with similarly
lucrative black markets, such as arms and drug trafficking.33
Despite the trade’s inevitability, the nations of the world have
a shared interest in curbing it to the greatest extent possible. The
illegal excavations and looting upon which the black market
depends have disastrous, irreparable effects.34 They “destroy[]
important aspects of the cultural heritage of source nations,”35
thereby creating sizeable gaps in source nations’ senses of
identities. 36 Moreover, whether performed by professional or
inexperienced looters, the search for objects with “particular
30

Steven F. Grover, The Need for Civil-Law Nations to Adopt Discovery
Rules in Art Replevin Actions: A Comparative Study, 70 T EX. L. REV . 1431,
1441 (1992).
31
McCord, supra note 23, at 989.
32
Warring, supra note 22, at 240 (citing Barry Meier & Martin Gottlieb,
An Illicit Journey Out of Egypt, Only a Few Questions Asked, N.Y. T IMES,
Feb. 23, 2004, at A1) (quoting Ricardo J. Elia) (“[P]eople think that there is an
illicit market and a legitimate market . . . . [i]n fact, it is the same.”).
33
Borodkin, supra note 21, at 378 nn.8 & 9 (“Americans routinely receive
mandatory prison sentences for possession and sale of narcotics. By contrast, a
typical punishment for smuggling archaeological artifacts is a fine, a suspended
sentence, and community service.”).
34
Borodkin, supra note 21, at 382–83 (“Once a site has been worked over
by looters in order to remove a few salable objects, the fragile fabric of its history
is largely destroyed.”).
35
Cohan, supra note 18, at 7.
36
Cohan, supra note 18, at 7; accord Laura M. Siegle, United States v.
Schultz: Putting Cultural Property in its Place, 18 T EMP. INT’ L & COMP. L.J.
453, 471 (2004) (stating that “spatial relations among archaeological remains”
can convey much information that is lost in illicit excavations); see also
Jonathan S. Moore, 97 YALE L.J. 466, 469 (1988) (stating that anthropological
archaeologists can learn a great deal about the habits and cultures of ancient
civilizations through undisturbed sites).
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aesthetic or perhaps historical attraction that will have a high
monetary value on the international art market” exerts tangible
effects. 37 Archaeological sites incur considerable damage,38 and
objects presumed to be of lesser monetary value are often
destroyed.39 The value of the very objects that are sought,
“discovered,” and sold on the black market is diminished as well.
Their irreversible decontextualization40 dramatically reduces their
archaeological, anthropological, and art historical significances. 41
Additionally, their market worth is frequently lessened by “hasty
and inexpert extraction and handling during the various illegal
transactions that inevitably occur before the[y] . . . finally come[]
to rest in a collector’s hands or a museum’s vault.”42
Commentators such as renowned cultural property law expert
John Merryman contend that the illicit antiquities market is a
positive phenomenon fueled by an appreciation for the works it
traffics, a desire to preserve them, and a corresponding belief that
they can best be taken care of by museums and private collectors. 43
37

Merryman, Elsen & Urice, supra note 17, at 220.
Cohan, supra note 18; Park, supra note 24 (stating that tomb robbers
often work “hastily and crudely”); Siegle, supra note 36 (stating that “[i]t is
important to preserve archaeological sites and their contents so that people can
understand how, when, and why the objects in them were created.”).
39
Merryman, Elsen & Urice, supra note 17, at 220.
40
Borodkin, supra note 21, at 399 (“[N]o court-made remedy can replace
lost archaeological information once an artifact has been dismembered, defaced,
or isolated from its context.”).
41
NEIL BRODIE , Export Deregulation and the Illicit Trade in
Archaeological Material, in LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL RESOURCES
85 (Jennifer R. Richman & Mario P. Forsyth eds., 2004); see also Park, supra
note 24, at 932–33 (“The antiquity, removed from its site without proper
evaluation, becomes nothing more than a decorative or aesthetic item with little
or no historical significance. Even if the item is recovered, the loss of history
cannot be.”).
42
Kelly, supra note 19, at 33.
43
See, e.g., John Henry Merryman, Cultural Property Internationalism, 12
INT’ L J. CULTURAL PROP. 11, 32 (2005) (stating that “a system, [such as that]
dictated by the preferences of retentive source nations and zealous
archaeologists . . . does not provide optimal conditions for the preservation of
the cultural heritage of all mankind or its optimal distribution for access, study,
and enjoyment”).
38
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According to such logic, “many pieces would be ignored or ruined
if left in place.”44 It is indeed conceivable that a particular ancient
object might be better attended to in a controlled environment, such
as on a pedestal in a major museum, than it would if left virtually
unknown in an underground tomb. But, as already noted, that
object’s journey through the black market would likely entail a
significant amount of damage,45 including the permanent loss of
information regarding that very object and the annihilation of any
number of other objects that were inadvertently unearthed in its
illicit excavation.46 In sum, “what the market purports to do
bestprotect the integrity of individual objectsdoes not always
succeed, due to both intentional and unintentional damage.”47
B. Defining “Repatriation” and its Variations
Cultural property repatriation is “the return of cultural
objects,” whether “to [their] nations of origin,” “to the nations
whose people include the cultural descendants of those who made
the objects,” or “to the nations whose territory includes their
original sites or the sites from which they were last removed.”48
The repatriation movement, and repatriation claims in general, rely
on two interconnected principles, namely, that cultural property
belongs in its source country, and that works that currently reside
abroad in museums and collections as the result of plunder, theft,
removal by colonial powers, illegal export, or exploitation should
be returned.49
When a museum uses the prospect of voluntary repatriation as
a bargaining chip, the act of repatriation tends to be accompanied
44

Kelly, supra note 19, at 52.
Moore, supra note 36.
46
Merryman, Elsen & Urice, supra note 17, at 220.
47
Patty Gerstenblith, The Public Interest in the Restitution of Cultural
Objects, 16 CONN . J. INT ’ L L. 197, 205–06 (2001) (providing as an example
that tomb raiders and site looters frequently destroy objects, either for ease of
transportation or out of ignorance).
48
John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property,
80 AM. J. I NT ’ L L. 831, 845 (1986).
49
Id.
45
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by a promise on the part of the source nation not to institute legal
proceedings, and often includes a public statement clearing the
museum’s name.50 Other terms that are commonly negotiated for
include split custody of the object at issue and the transfer of title
to the source nation while the object remains housed in the
museum.51 The parties may agree to a return schedule that allows
the museum to exhibit the work before relinquishing it, or, as has
been a popular feature of the recent MBRAs, the source nation
may promise to lend the museum comparable works in the near
future.52
The need to closely examine the utility of MBRAs as a
variation of voluntary repatriation is pressing. Numerous
repatriation claims were brought or threatened over the past two
years: Italy is currently in negotiations for the return of objects
residing at both the Princeton University Art Museum53 and the
Cleveland Museum of Art, 54 and has suggested that it may soon
lay claims to works at the Toledo Museum of Art, the
Minneapolis Institute of Arts, and the Virginia Museum of Fine
50

For instance, the repatriating nation might publicly state that it does not
believe that the museum acquired the object at issue knowing of its questionable
provenance, and that the museum was highly cooperative in rectifying the
situation once informed. Palmer, supra note 16.
51
For example, in 2002, France and Nigeria entered into an agreement
wherein France recognized Nigeria’s title to the sculptures at issue, and in
return, Nigeria agreed to allow those objects to remain at a certain museum in
France for a renewable period of 25 years. Such leases provide an alternative to
outright restitution, allowing the market nation to keep the cultural object so
long as it pays the source nation, in some desirable form, to do so. Warring,
supra note 22, at 293–94.
52
This was the case in three of the most prominent MBRAs reached in
2006 (those between Italy and the Met, Italy and the BMFA, and Greece and the
Getty), all of which contained provisions specifying that the repatriating nations
would lend the repatriating nations works in the future. See Flescher, supra note
2, at 4–5; Frammolino & Felch, supra note 7; Press Release, Hellenic Republic
Ministry of Culture and The J. Paul Getty Trust Issue Joint Statement, supra
note 11.
53
Patty Gerstenblith & Bonnie Czegledi, International Cultural Property,
40 INT ’ L LAW . 441, 449 (2006).
54
Steven Litt, Report Says Italy may Press Art Museum for Antiquities,
PLAIN D EALER, Oct. 2, 2006, at D6.
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Arts. 55 Additionally, Egypt has recently claimed a mask possessed
by the St. Louis Art Museum and has had a long-standing request
to Germany for the return of the bust of Nefertiti.56 Finally, in
September 2007, Yale University agreed to return thousands of
Inca artifacts to the Peruvian government that were illegally
removed from Machu Picchu nearly a century ago, but the parties
have not yet finalized the terms of the return.57 Although by no
means exhaustive, this list illustrates the copious number of
MBRAs that may be reached in the proximate future.
C. The Desirability of Repatriation
Any analysis of the utility of MBRAs must necessarily begin
with an examination of whether repatriation is desirable, either as a
means or an end. This subsection will articulate five primary
arguments in favor of repatriation and assess the validity of their
critiques, in order to show that repatriation of select cultural
property is desirable, both as a remedy for the detrimental effects
of the illicit antiquities trade and to deter its continuation and
growth.
1.

Comporting with Morals

In many situations repatriation may simply seem to be the
morally appropriate course of action.58 This may be because it
would remedy the effects of an unfortunate historic event.59 For
example, the object at issue may have been plundered in time of

55

Gerstenblith & Czegledi, supra note 53.
Flescher, supra note 2, at 5.
57
Flescher, supra note 2, at 5.
58
See David Rudenstine, Cultural Property: The Hard Question of
Repatriation, The Rightness and Utility of Voluntary Repatriation, 19
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT . L.J. 69, 70 (2001) (“[S]elective repatriation of cultural
patrimony may be the right thing to do in that it responds to a[] historical
episode that, in the opinion of many, should not have occurred and which
remains a source of bitter contention today.”).
59
Id.
56
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war or while the source nation was under colonial rule.60 It may
also be because, as a result of losing its cultural property, the
source nation has become economically deprived.61 That is, cultural
property draws tourists, which in turn, boost economies.62 By
repatriating cultural patrimony, source nations whose people or
ancestors created the objects receive this benefit, rather than market
nations63 whose people obtained them illegally.64
Instead of contesting whether repatriation is the “right” course
of action in cultural property disputes, anti-repatriationists tend to
respond by seeking to invalidate the source nation’s title. Their
rationales may be temporal based, asserting that the current
possessor of the object has had it for such a long period that it has
effectively become part of the patrimony of the society in which
that possessor is located.65 Alternatively, they may be historically
based. For instance, it has been argued that the “rights of claimants
have been abrogated . . . [in situations where the] group from which
the property originated no longer exists.”66 Finally, it is frequently
asserted that the institution in which a stolen artifact is housed
should be entitled to maintain it because it is responsible for the
degree to which the artifact has been preserved.67
These contentions, however, are highly problematic. While the
first counter-argument relies upon the inaccurate notion that the
passage of time necessarily functions as a statute of limitations, the
second ignores the many benefits that may be gained from

60

See, e.g., Christine K. Knox, They’ve Lost Their Marbles, 29 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT ’ L L. REV . 315, 330 (2006) (Ethiopia and Italy reached a deal for the
return of an enormous 1,700 year old obelisk taken while Ethiopia was under
colonial rule in 1937. In 2004, Italy dismantled the obelisk and was working on
transporting it back.).
61
See Kelly, supra note 19, at 46.
62
See Kelly, supra note 19, at 46.
63
Although not necessarily distinct from one another, market nations may
be thought of as those that have the largest markets for illicit antiquities, and
source nations as those that tend to supply the market.
64
Kelly, supra note 19, at 46.
65
Rudenstine, supra note 58, at 79.
66
Cohan, supra note 18.
67
See Greenfield, supra note 17.
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recontextualizing artifacts, even if they are not returned to the
direct descendants of their creators. The significance of returning
cultural patrimony is not necessarily that it “is . . . something
owned by a people, but [rather, that it is] something of them, a
part of their defining collective identity.”68 Additionally, the third
counter-argument relies upon the untenable presumption that the
object would have been damaged or destroyed were it not stolen,
and that this hypothetical situation should therefore trump the
rights of the original owner. In short, the moralistic grounds for
repatriation continue to hold validity as a reason for returning illicit
cultural property.
2.

Positive Social Effects

Repatriation also has the potential to exert positive social
effects. As recent MBRAs demonstrate, “generosity can forge
bonds between nations and foreign institutions and encourage
future collaboration[s].”69 One of the driving forces behind the
MBRA reached between the Getty and Italy in 2006 was the
Getty’s desire to establish a new working relationship with Italy. 70
In some cases, MBRAs may explicitly require parties to maintain a
cooperative rapport with one another. For example, under the
terms of the February 2006 MBRA between the Met and Italy, the
Met must respect the negotiated return dates for the objects in the
Morgantina Collection and the Euphronios krater, while Italy will
be obliged to follow through on its promise to provide the museum
with long-term loans. 71 Moreover, in a more general sense,
68

Rudenstine, supra note 58, at 76; see also Cohan, supra note 18, at 104
(“The development of culture is a continuous process; it is hard to draw distinct
lines separating a people’s sense of cultural heritage from the distant past to the
present.”).
69
Warring, supra note 22, at 295.
70
Tracy Wilkinson, Jason Felch & Ralph Frammolino, Getty to Return
Artworks to Italy, L.A. T IMES, June 22, 2006, at A1 (quoting an attorney
negotiating on behalf of the Getty as saying, “[w]e are not just arguing over
objects, but we are working on a long-term relationship between the Getty and
its natural partner, Italy, with respect to antiquities”).
71
New Era Opens for Looted Art, ANSA ENGLISH MEDIA SERVICE, Nov.
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repatriation may be seen as an expression of respect, potentially
leading to improved international relations between the source
nation and the nation in which the object is located.
Not all commentators agree that such positive social effects
should dictate the use of repatriation. Rather, some focus on the
need to protect cultural property, and specifically, on the wealth of
resources that museums in market nations have at their disposal to
ensure the preservation of artifacts, contrasted with the lack
thereof possessed by many source nations. 72 Accordingly, these
commentators argue that when the institution housing the work in a
market nation provides a superior facility to that available in the
source nation, the object should not be subject to repatriation.73
Essentially, these arguments paternalistically equate a museum’s
ability to care for art with its right to do so, asserting that museums
are entitled to retain cultural property at issue because “source
nations lack or fail to provide human and financial resources and
the organizational structure needed to deal adequately with their
cultural resources.”74
But even conceding that market nations may, in certain
instances, be better equipped to preserve artifacts than source
nations, the above counter-argument ultimately maintains the
status quo. There is little chance that source nations will ever
possess resources that rival those of market nations if their riches
continue to be plundered, and they continue to be forced to spend
funds on recovery that otherwise could be spent on preservation
and exhibition. Moreover, the belief that market nations deserve to
retain illicitly acquired artifacts simply because they have superior
means to care for such works is unabashedly supremacist and
imperialist. One need only consider the logical extension of such
argumentsthat discrepancies in monetary wealth justify the
looting and retention of all valuables, man-made and natural, from
30, 2006 (Italy has already loaned the Met a Greek calyx under the agreement).
72
See, e.g., David Lowenthal, Why Sanctions Seldom Work, 12 INT ’ L J.
OF CULTURAL PROP. 393, 396 (2005) (“Italy is so stuffed with treasure that
only a small fraction of it is catalogued or adequately cared for, let alone open to
the public. Things are much the same the world over.”).
73
Id.
74
Merryman, Elsen & Urice, supra note 17, at 417–18.
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non-first world nationsan obviously indefensible proposition.
3.

Mitigating the Effects of the Black Market

Repatriationists also argue that the process helps mitigate the
loss of information and tangible destruction that stem from the
black market. 75 As previously discussed, the search for artifacts to
supply the black market results in losses on multiple levels, and
decontextualization can diminish, if not annihilate, the meaning of
certain works of art.76 By returning looted and illegally-exported
objects to their source nations, repatriation provides the potential
for them to be “put[] . . . in the correct geographic and sociological
context to better interpret their meaning and significance.”77
In response, anti-repatriationists contend that such
recontextualization rarely actually occurs, but rather, that
repatriated cultural property tends simply to be transferred from a
museum in the market nation to one in the source nation.78 In such
situations, it is asserted, the return of the artifact provides little, if
any, enrichment to its original cultural context, and the work often
is less accessible to viewers than it was in its previous location.79
But even in situations where repatriated objects are not returned to
their original find-site, their greater proximity to it “can provide
more information and convey greater meaning to historians,
archaeologists, and tourists.”80
75

See Kelly, supra note 19, at 46.
John E. Bersin, The Protection of Cultural Property and the Promotion
of International Trade in Art, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT ’ L & COMP. L. 125, 136
(1992); see also Kelly, supra note 19, at 54 (“As more mosaics are torn from
their walls by torchlight, more artifacts are looted from burial chambers by
moonlight and more paintings and tapestries are ripped from their mountings by
thugs and thieves, science loses the ability to place the piece in its historical
context, thus, never adding to the world’s knowledge information about the lost
civilization that produced it.”).
77
Kelly, supra note 19, at 46.
78
Rudenstine, supra note 58, at 77.
79
Rudenstine, supra note 58, at 78–79.
80
Siegle, supra note 36 (“[O]bserving an artifact in its proper context can
provide more information and convey greater meaning to historians,
archaeologists, and tourists . . . . The number of cultural objects and their
76
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The Possibility of a Comparatively Free Cultural Property
Market

Repatriation additionally has the potential to exert a positive
effect on the legitimate art market.81 The cultural property
retention schemes82 of source nations are often criticized as
overbroad, nondiscriminatory, and self-defeating.83 As both a
symbol of a unified effort in the fight against the illicit antiquities
trade and as material assistance in remedying its effects, the
repatriation of artifacts may encourage source nations to adopt
more moderate policies, thereby leading to a comparatively free
cultural property market. 84 In other words, “[v]oluntary
repatriation may well stimulate an era of good feeling which, in
turn, may prompt art source nations to reconsider their ownership
and exportation policies.”85
Anti-repatriationists assert that source nations excessively
hoard their cultural property, “indiscriminately retain[ing]
duplicates of objects beyond any conceivable domestic need, while
[obstructing the free market by] refusing to make them available to
museums, collectors, and dealers abroad.”86 The same argument,
spatial relationships among archaeological remains tells archaeologists much
about the habits of ancient civilizations.”).
81
Rudenstine, supra note 58.
82
The term “cultural property retention scheme” refers to the various laws,
including national patrimony laws and national export laws, enacted in attempts
to retain cultural patrimony.
83
Rudenstine, supra note 58, at 81
[T]he definition of cultural property subject to these restrictionsis
exceedingly broad and results in the accumulation, within theart source
nation, of an overwhelming amount of culturalproperty that far and
away outstrips any reasonable needs orinterests it may have . . . .
[Additionally,] the restrictive policiescontribute to a black market in
antiquities that leads to thedestruction of unexcavated archaeological
sites, the destructionof artifacts themselves, and the inability to further
theinformation of knowledge about the past.
Id.
84
Rudenstine, supra note 58.
85
Rudenstine, supra note 58, at 81.
86
Merryman, supra note 48, at 847. Note that by the term “duplicates,”
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however, can be made against the retention of these works by
museums in market nations. It is commonly conceded that “[m]ajor
western museums are so laden with objects of every kind that there
are not the facilities for them to be permanently or properly
exhibited, and [that] much material is simply stored, never to be
viewed by the public.”87 Moreover, whether a certain antiquity
should be considered a duplicate or “surplus” should be a
determination made by the source nation, which has the
opportunity to engage in a “close, systematic inspection [that]
might reveal small but significant points of dissimilarity,”88 as well
as the legitimate prerogative to decide that the retention of
duplicates is desirable. Significantly, even if repatriation claims do
stem from “excessive hoarding,” using this observation as an excuse
for retaining illicit antiquities will likely lead source nations to
adopt retention schemes that are even more stringent; both history
and logic indicate that, as the black market grows, art-rich nations
respond by further tightening their export laws pertaining to
cultural property. 89
5.

Attaining Cultural Nationalist Goals

Finally, in many situations, repatriation may be appropriate
because the cultural property at issue is intrinsic to its source
nation’s cultural heritage.90 That is, “[w]orks of art, unique
geological structures[,] and other objects laden with significance by

commentators do not refer to works that are indistinguishable from one another,
but rather, to works that date from the same period, which possess very similar
aesthetic value, design, and function.
87
Greenfield, supra note 17, at 298.
88
“[W]ithout a full and proper examination, it is not an easy task to decide
what may be ‘redundant’. The decision cannot be made on stylistic criteria
alone.” Brodie, supra note 41, at 86.
89
Kelly, supra note 19, at 54.
90
Merryman, supra note 48, at 831–32; see also Greenfield, supra note 17,
at 297 (“[C]ultural property is most important to the people who created it or
for whom it was created or whose particular identity and history it is bound up
with. This cannot be compared with the scholastic or even inspirational
influence on those who merely acquire such objects or materials.”).
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the duration of their exposure, [are frequently] patriotic symbols of
national pride.”91 This idea, termed “cultural nationalism,” “gives
[source] nations a special interest [in their cultural property],
implies the attribution of national character to objects,
independently of their location or ownership, and legitimizes both
national export controls and demands for . . . repatriation.” 92
In opposition to cultural nationalists, anti-repatriationists and
market nations have a propensity to invoke cultural internationalist
arguments, characterized by the notion that cultural property
should be considered to be “components of a common human
culture, whatever their places of origin or present location,
independent of property rights or national jurisdiction.”93 To the
cultural internationalist, “everyone has [a somewhat equivalent]
interest in the preservation and enjoyment of cultural property,”94
and the opportune location for works should be determined by
factors such as where they would be best preserved and accessible
to the largest audiences.95
Facially, cultural nationalist and cultural internationalist goals
are dichotomous and seem to lead in inconsistent directions:
Whereas cultural nationalism has been described as “nationalist”
and “retentive,” cultural internationalism as been lauded as
“cosmopolitan” and “protective.”96 In practice, however, they are
not mutually exclusive, and thus it is not necessary to evaluate
them against one another.97 As the following section will elaborate,
theoretically, both cultural nationalist and cultural internationalist
goals can be attained through compromises such as MBRAs. As
such, cultural internationalist theories are more aptly construed as
reminders of certain considerations that should be taken into
account in any international cultural property dispute than they are
91

Bersin, supra note 76, at 138.
Merryman, supra note 48, at 831–32.
93
Merryman, supra note 48, at 831–32.
94
Merryman, supra note 43, at 11.
95
Siegle, supra note 36, at 454.
96
Merryman, supra note 48, at 836.
97
Eminent scholar John Merryman has suggested that, when incompatible,
cultural internationalists’ goals should trump those of cultural nationalists.
Merryman, supra note 48, at 853.
92
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per se arguments weighing against repatriation.
II. T HE UTILITY OF M UTUALLY BENEFICIAL R EPATRIATION
A GREEMENTS
Repatriation of select illicit cultural property will clearly
diminish the illicit antiquities market and the damage it exerts. Here,
however, the focus will be on whether entrance into MBRAs, as a
variation of “pure”98 repatriation, is a desirable method. In the
early 1980s, Professor Paul Bator suggested that it was, writing
that, “museums [should] consider arrangements with foreign
museums and governments that involve reciprocal measures, rather
than simply repatriation of objects to their countries of origin.”99
Over two decades later, some of the most esteemed American
museums appear to be heeding Professor Bator’s advice. Using the
February 2006 MBRA reached between Italy and the Met as a
reference point, this section will focus on both the contractual and
incidental benefits that can potentially flow from such
compromises.
To start with the tangible, negotiated benefits of the 2006
agreement, the terms of the MBRA will benefit the Met in several
ways. First, the return will occur in three phases, beginning with
the return of four classical Apulian vases,100 as soon as possible.101
Then, in 2008, the Met will return the Euphronios krater, credited
as “one of the finest existing examples of Greek vessels from the
98

I use this term to refer to siutations where the museum or other possessor
of the disputed object agrees to repatriate it without receiving anything in return.
99
Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN .
L. REV . 275, 364 (1982).
100
More specifically, the vases consist of a 6th Century Laconian kylix
acquired by the Met in 1999, a red-figured Apulian Dinos dating from between
340-320 B.C. and acquired by the Met in 1984, a red-figured psykter decorated
with horsemen, ca. 520 B.C., acquired by the Met in 1996, and a red-figured
Attic amphora by the Berlin painter, ca. 490 B.C., acquired by the Met in 1985.
Press Release, Statement by the Metropolitan Museum of Art on its Agreement
With the Italian Ministry of Culture (Feb. 21, 2006), http://www.metmuseum.
org/Press_Room/index.asp (follow “Press Release Archive” hyperlink; then
follow “February 2006” hyperlink).
101
Kennedy & Eakin, supra note 1.
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sixth century B.C.,”102 which the museum purchased in 1972 for $1
million.103 The return will be completed in 2010, when the Met will
relinquish the fifteen-piece silverware set known as the Morgantina
Collection, which the museum purchased in two lots in the early
1980s for approximately $2.75 million.104 This schedule is
especially beneficial for the Met because it will enable the museum
to exhibit the Euphronios krater for nine months in its Greek and
Roman galleries, which opened in April 2007.105
Additionally, the agreement will protect the Met’s reputation,
as it contains particular clauses specifying that the Met acquired
the artifacts in good faith and waives Italy’s right to pursue any
form of legal action against the museum for these works. 106 Finally,
Italy has promised the Met long-term loans of works of equal
beauty and importance.107 Although precisely which works will be
loaned has not been finalized,108 the significance of this promise
and its role in encouraging the Met to return the works that were at
issue must not be downplayed. Indeed, the Director of the Met
publicly stated that, “[the museum] is particularly gratified that,
through this agreement, its millions of annual visitors will continue
to see comparably great works of ancient art on long-term loan
from Italy to this institution.”109
Italy undoubtedly reaps the principle tangible benefit of this
agreement insofar as it will have its cultural property and heritage
102

Anthee Carassava, Greek Officials Planning to Bring Charges Against
Ex-Curator, N.Y.T IMES, May 5, 2006, at A3.
103
Slayman, supra note 4.
104
Maura Singleton, Plunder: The Theft of the Morgantina Silver, U. V A.
MAG ., Spring 2006, available at http://www.uvamagazine.org/site/ (then follow
“Back Issues” hyperlink; then follow “The Theft of the Morgantina Silver”
hyperlink).
105
Press Release, Statement by the Metropolitan Museum of Art on its
Agreement With the Italian Ministry of Culture, supra note 100.
106
Flescher, supra note 2.
107
Povoledo, supra note 6, at E5.
108
In the same month that the MBRA was signed, Italy announced its
selection of objects to lend, but the Met has not yet announced which objects it
will accept. Flescher, supra note 2.
109
Press Release, Statement by the Metropolitan Museum of Art on its
Agreement With the Italian Ministry of Culture, supra note 100.
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back in its possession. In addition, while the Euphronios krater and
the artifacts in the Morgantina Collection remain on exhibit at the
Met, they are accompanied by labels reading “Lent by the
Republic of Italy.”110 This association will thus publicize the
works, and quite plausibly bolster tourism to see them once they
have been returned.
Apart from negotiated benefits such as these, other significant
advantages stem from MBRAs. First and foremost, they allow
parties to avoid the costs, time, and risks associated with civil
litigation, which has been called “the dispute mechanism of last
resort.”111 The expense of repatriation litigation tends to be
“astronomical,”112 and at times, may outweigh that of the object at
issue.113 MBRAs also allow source nations to avoid the
“insurmountable obstacles and . . . procedural pitfalls [of litigation
that] are often impossible for dispossessed owners to
overcome.”114 Moreover, as with all settlements, compromises
such as MBRAs skirt the “winner-takes-all” approach of litigation.
This conciliatory approach is especially preferable given that
disputes over cultural restitution often arouse deep-seated
emotions, 115 and “delicate moral and cultural issues.”116
In addition, willingness to enter into an MBRA reflects
constructively upon both parties in terms of public relations. For a
museum like the Met, a press release stating that it has agreed to
repatriate an object from its collection pursuant to an MBRA
suggests both that it is eager to “do the right thing,” and that it

110

Flescher, supra note 2.
Thomas Kline, Conference: Neutrality, Morality, and the Holocaust,
14 AM. U. INT ’ L L. REV . 243, 248 (1998) (speaking generally with regard to
civil litigation).
112
McCord, supra note 23, at 996.
113
Warring, supra note 22, at 289.
114
These include choice of law conflicts, statutes of limitations, and
antiquities that predate the government claiming ownership. Cohan, supra note
18, at 69.
115
Bersin, supra note 76, at 134.
116
Paterson, supra note 20, at 74 (quoting the ILA Committee Report’s
Draft Principles for Cooperation in the Mutual Protection and Transfer of
Cultural Material).
111
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lacked culpability in acquiring the object. For source nations,
MBRAs suggest a keenness to compromise that may attract more
sympathy for their efforts to repatriate works, limit looting, and
curb illegal exportation, than would a display of steadfast
entitlement.117 On a related note, MBRAs may also benefit
international relations, 118 as they require source nations and
purchasers in market nations to find a common ground, rather than
become adversaries.
Further, MBRAs negate the aforementioned idea that cultural
nationalism and cultural internationalism are dueling, irreconcilable
philosophies with mutually exclusive goals.119 MBRAs function to
return objects of cultural patrimony to their source nations,
thereby providing the cultural descendants of their creators with
the opportunity to recontextualize them and fulfilling the cultural
nationalist’s agenda.120 At the same time, when MBRAs include a
term promising that the source nation will provide the museum
bestowing restitution with future long-term loans, the source nation
maintains a presence within the museum and market nation,
furthering the cultural internationalist’s agenda. As physical
substitutes for the repatriated works, the works on loan become
the new “cultural ambassadors”121 for the source nation, and the
advantages that stem from the international distribution of cultural
property 122 are not forfeited. In the words of UNESCO’s 1976
Recommendation Concerning the International Exchange of Cultural
Property, MBRAs are “enriching to all parties [and] also lead to a

117

Warring, supra note 22, at 291 (“[R]equests for restitution are [often]
marked [by] a sense of entitlement and . . . unwillingness to compromise on
both sides.”).
118
Warring, supra note 22, at 243–44. If the “illicit acquisition of foreign
national patrimony by U.S. citizens strains the United States’ relations with
source countries,” James E. Sherry, 37 GEO . W ASH . INT ’ L L. REV . 511, 512
(2005), presumably the return of such works will have a neutralizing effect.
119
Cohan, supra note 18, at 62.
120
Merryman, supra note 48, at 832.
121
Borodkin, supra note 21, at 408 (The “international circulation of
antiquities serves legitimate interests because art objects can act as cultural
ambassadors, overcoming prejudices and national parochialism.”).
122
Merryman, Elsen & Urice, supra note 17, at 417–18.
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better use of the international community’s cultural heritage which
is the sum of all the national heritages.”123 In effect, MBRAs
account for the cultural nationalists’ view that nations have a
special interest in maintaining their cultural property, and also
“provide the countries of origin with an opportunity to ensure that
their cultural and artistic legacy will continue”124 beyond their
borders.
As a related benefit, MBRAs circumvent the oft-cited concern
that voluntary repatriation on behalf of museums will eventually
lead to the depletion of their antiquities collections.125 Some
commentators have suggested that this notion is unrealistic.126
Admittedly, antiquities are unique works and cannot be equated
with one another, but by agreeing to long-term loans “of equal
beauty and importance,”127 source nations such as Italy provide a
form of compensation that mitigates the effects of the repatriation.
Finally, when MBRAs include a promise on the part of source
nations to loan future works to the repatriating institutions, the
agreements help counterbalance retention schemes consisting of
highly restrictive national patrimony laws and export
prohibitions.128 In general, such schemes are controversial and
123

Cohan, supra note 18, at 58; see also Merryman, Elsen & Urice, supra
note 17, at 417 (The “international distribution of works of a nation’s earlier
cultures or of its more recent artists is in the nation’s interest.”).
124
Kirby, supra note 28, at 744.
125
Rudenstine, supra note 58, at 76.
126
Rudenstine, supra note 58, at 76; see also Constance Lowenthal and
Stephen E. Weil, A Dialogue on Provenance and Due Diligence, 3 IFAR J. 10,
14 (2000) (When asked whether she was concerned that, “if we start by
returning a few objects now, we will be getting onto a slippery slope and that
over the next century or so museums will be emptied out completely,”
Constance Lowenthal, the Director of the Commission for Art Recovery,
responded, “I don’t really think that’s going to be possible even if it were
someone’s goal. And I don’t know whose goal it might be.”). But even if this
apprehension does have some merit, it is rendered immaterial with MBRAs,
which mitigate the “pinch” of repatriation so that a diminution of the museum’s
collection does not necessarily result.
127
Jason Felch, Getty Might Return Some Antiquities, L.A. T IMES, May
17, 2006, at E1.
128
Rudenstine, supra note 58, at 80.
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widely criticized.129 By adopting them, source nations are accused
of “fail[ing] to spread their culture[s], . . . fail[ing] to exploit such
objects as a valuable resource for trade[,] and . . . contribut[ing] to
the cultural impoverishment of people in other parts of the
world.”130 Additionally, many commentators suggest that such
schemes are self-defeating,131 functioning not to effectively limit
the trade in cultural property, but simply to cordon off the
legitimate market and expand its illicit counterpart.132 Italy’s
national retention scheme provides a typical example, comprised of
both a national ownership law133 vesting ownership in the state of
any artifacts found in its soil since 1902, and various other
regulations generally forbidding the export of any cultural property
created over half a century prior.134 The breadth of these laws lends
heightened value to Italy’s pledged long-term loans to the Met and
the BMFA under the MBRAs reached last year. Moreover, as a
result of the loans, the museums may have a lesser “need” or
inclination, however minimal, to acquire antiquities in the near
future.
III. MBRAS PERPETUATE THE ILLICIT A NTIQUITIES TRADE
Notwithstanding the benefits that flow from repatriation and
MBRAs in particular, entrance into MBRAs is not the ideal means
for solving cultural property disputes. By minimizing the inherent
risks and padding any possible losses, MBRAs encourage
museums to continue to acquire works of questionable provenance.
129

See Merryman, supra note 48, at 847.
Merryman, supra note 48, at 847.
131
Warring, supra note 22, at 277 ( “UNESCO should stop towing the line
and acknowledge that strict national retention only hurts the source nations’
cause.”).
132
Merryman, supra note 48, at 848 (“Historically, the tighter the export
control in the source nation, the stronger has been the pressure to form an illicit
market . . . . [M]ore controls produce more illegal trade, which calls for more
controls, and so it escalates.”).
133
United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 134 (2d
Cir. 1999).
134
Park, supra note 24, at 940.
130
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At the same time, as a form of settlement, MBRAs detract from
the formation of much-needed legal precedent that would inform
source nations as to the strength of their prospective legal claims
and deter museums from participating in the illicit antiquities
market.
A. MBRAs Encourage Museums to Continue to Acquire Works
of Questionable Provenance
Before the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property (the “UNESCO Convention”)
was adopted in 1970, the United States was famous for
overlooking the importation of looted and illegally exported cultural
property and bore a corresponding reputation as the largest market
for illicitly obtained cultural property.135 Many commentators
assert that, since 1970, American museums have exercised greater
self-control in terms of collection expansion,136 have increasingly
started to inquire into donors’ identities before accepting gifts of
questionable origin,137 and have become more careful about
researching the origins of artifacts before purchasing them.138
Others note that the illicit antiquities trade has grown since the
UNESCO Convention,139 and contend that, regardless of the more
135

Claudia Caruthers, International Cultural Property: Another Tragedy of
the Commons, 7 PAC . R IM . L. & P OL ’ Y 143, 151 (1998).
136
Id. (explaining that many museums in the United States have adopted
formal acquisition policies requiring legal title, proof of compliance with the
UNESCO Convention’s export provisions, and information on provenance).
Contra Sherry, supra note 118, at 515–16 (quoting the director-general of
UNESCO, who conceded that, “thirty years after the adoption of the UNESCO
Convention . . . theft, looting, and illicit excavation continue on an appalling
scale, thereby causing an endless depletion of peoples’ cultural treasures.”).
137
Kelly, supra note 19, at 36–37.
138
Kelly, supra note 19, at 31–32; Caruthers, supra note 135, at 169 n.42
(quoting former Director of the Met, Thomas Hoving, as saying that in the
1960s, the museum’s general acquisition policy was to “not ask anybody where
[antiquities] came from. If [the museum] like[d] them, [the museum] bought
them.”).
139
Warring, supra note 22, at 232, 236.
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stringent, ethically-sound acquisition policies museums may
purport to practice, they remain complicit in their ways. 140
Regardless, it is undeniable that western museums are a major
player in the art and antiquities market,141 and at least until
relatively recently, they freely purchased works of questionable
provenance.142 Consequently, some of the most prominent
American museums currently house “some of the most high profile
pieces of allegedly stolen artifacts.”143 To illustrate, an estimated
350 items at the Getty, worth approximately $100 million, are said
to be of dubious provenance.144 As source nations accumulate the
evidence, means, and willpower to bring repatriation claims for
some of these works, museums essentially react by voluntarily
returning the object at issue, by refusing to acknowledge the claim
in hope that it will disappear, and if not does not do so, litigating
the dispute, or finally, by attempting to reach an MBRA with the
source nation.
When faced with strong evidence indicating that objects in their
collections were illicitly excavated and/or illegally exported from
identifiable source nations, museums should employ the first
option and voluntarily repatriate those works. Voluntary
repatriation allows museums to act as “stewards” for the public
good, transferring works with questionable provenance from the
140

Steele IV, supra note 25, at 685 (“[D]espite their virtuous public
stance, most museums continue to turn a blind eye toward evidence tending to
illuminate the illicit origins of the objects they seek or have already acquired.”).
141
McCord, supra note 23, at 987.
142
Alia Szopa, Hoarding History: A Survey of Antiquity Looting and Black
Market Trade, 13 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV . 55, 83 (2004).
143
Warring, supra note 22, at 238. See also Steele IV, supra note 25
(“The vast majority of the world’s plundered and illegally exported antiquities
sits in the homes of private collectors and in the halls of museums.”).
144
These items were identified by an internal review conducted by the
Getty Trust. Additionally, there are 52 artifacts that the Italian government is
attempting to repatriate from the Getty. These objects include “many of the
most prestigious and striking exhibits at the . . . recently reopened Getty
Villa . . . [and] include a sculpture of two griffins, a marble and limestone
sculpture of the Greek goddess Aphrodite and a bronze known as Victorious
Youth.” Dan Glaister, Getty Museum Admits 350 More Treasures May Be
Looted, T HE GUARDIAN (LONDON), June 19, 2006, at 23.
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private to the public realm, where they can be studied, publicized,
and preserved while their legal standing is researched.145 Instead,
however, museums often choose to employ the second option:
ignoring source nations’ inquiries and claims until it becomes
impossible to do so,146 intentionally refraining from calling
attention to disputed works through exhibition,147 and relying upon
procedural defenses when faced with lawsuits. 148 As long as
museums believe that the foreign governments do not have enough
evidence to prove ownership claims, they tend to “fight hard to
retain [the] objects.”149
The first and third options—voluntarily returning the works or
the
employment
of
MBRAS—are
encouraged
by
intergovernmental organizations, such as the Association of Art
Museum Directors (“AAMD”), the International Council of
145

JAMES CUNO, W HO O WNS T HE PAST ? CULTURAL POLICY, CULTURAL
PROPERTY, AND T HE LAW 151 (Kate Fitz Gibbon ed., Rutgers Univ. Press
2005). See also James Cuno, Museums and the Acquisition of Antiquities, 19
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 83, 92 (2001).
146
For example, Turkey struggled to repatriate the 363 sixth-century
artifacts known as the Lydian Hoard for over 25 years despite the Met being
aware from the time of acquisition that the artifacts had recently been illegally
excavated. Only after Turkey brought suit against the Met in United States
federal district court, and the court denied the Met’s motion to dismiss the
claim based on the statute of limitations, did the Met agree to return the entire
collection. Gerstenblith, supra note 21, at 410.
147
Gerstenblith, supra note 21, at 409.
Because of the Met’s fears of discovery, the acquisition of [the Lydian
Hoard] was not announced and most of the objects remained in storage
in the basement unavailable to scholars and the public. In 1984,
several of the vessels were put on display, but were [deliberately]
mislabeled as ‘East Greek’ in origin so as to confuse any who would
attempt to search out the collection’s true origin.
Id.
148

Once the Lydian Hoard works were finally exhibited and Turkey was
able to bring its claim, the Met filed a motion to dismiss based on the
expiration of the statute of limitations, notwithstanding its aforementioned
knowledge that the objects had indeed been illicitly excavated and exported.
Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
149
Gertner, supra note 20.
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Museums (“ICOM”), and the American Association of Museums
(“AAM”).150 AAMD recommends that museums thoroughly
“investigat[e] provenance and return[] art acquired through
questionable means.”151 Additionally, ICOM and AAM propose
that museums cooperate with repatriation requests from countries
of origin,152 and have even “promulgated rules and guidelines
designed to help museums either avoid provenance disputes or [to]
handle their consequences.”153 For example, in 1979, the ICOM
Executive Committee concluded the following after it adopted a
Study on the Principles, Conditions, and Means for the Restitution
or Return of Cultural Property in View of Reconstituting
Dispersed Heritages (“ICOM Study”):
In cases where the methods of acquisition . . . may be
considered unethical by standards either [when the work
was acquired] or by standards since, museums should weigh
both legal and ethical considerations when considering
requests for repatriation . . . [as well as] the value and
benefit of such objects to their public mission [as compared
to] the interests of the requesting party. 154
However, neither ethical codes nor guidelines such as the ICOM
150

Shirley Foster, Prudent ProvenanceLooking Your Gift Horse in the
Mouth, 8 UCLA ENT. L. REV . 143, 148 (2001); Kirby, supra note 28, at 73940. See also ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums, 2006, http://
icom.museum/ethics.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).
151
Foster, supra note 150, at 148.
152
See Kirby, supra note 28, at 739–40.
153
Kirby, supra note 28, at 744; see, e.g., ICOM Ethics of Acquisition,
http://icom.museum/acquisition.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2007) (directing its
member museums, inter alia, to observe the highest ethical standards “. . . in
the very important process of acquisition,” and providing that “[i]f a museum is
offered objects, the licit quality of which it has reason to doubt, it will contact
the competent authorities of the country of origin in an effort to help this country
safeguard its national heritage”); see, e.g., American Association of Museums
Code of Ethics for Museums, http://www.aam-us.org/museumresources/ethics/
coe.cfm (last visited Nov. 12, 2007) (directing museums to handle “competing
claims of ownership that may be asserted in connection with objects in its
custody . . . openly, seriously, responsively and with respect for the dignity of
all parties involved.”).
154
Cohan, supra note 18, at 83–84.
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Study are binding.155 Consequently, although museums may
purport to follow them generally, they “have no [great] incentive
to [do so in cases where it] would mean parting with a valued
object from their permanent collections.”156
Although groups such as AAMD, ICOM, and AAM
specifically address the utility of MBRAs in their advocacy of
returning illicit art, MBRAs are distinctly disadvantageous when
compared with pure repatriation or litigation. MBRAs lack a
deterrent effect, encouraging museums to continue to acquire works
of questionable provenance by padding the risk that would
otherwise accompany investing funds in works to which title might
be tainted.157 The reality for museums becomes that, even in the
very worst of situations, they will be able to exhibit and profit
from the illicit work for a number of years. Then, when the time
comes to return the work, museums will be given a concession,
perhaps in the form of long-term loans of other works to which
they might not otherwise be entitled, and will gain positive
publicity for their cooperation, thereby counteracting any
reputational damage. As such, museums are not forced to “feel” the
loss of works that they wrongly acquire or the repercussions of
their having done so, and acquiring such works becomes well worth
the gamble. Since museums are major players in the illicit art
market, it follows that MBRAs have the potential to inadvertently
perpetuate its existence.
B. MBRAs Detract from the Formation of Much-Needed
International Legal Precedent
Although “current [international] law unquestioningly assumes
that repatriation is a good end in and of itself,”158 it does not
155

See Kirby, supra note 28, at 744.
See Kirby, supra note 28, at 744.
157
James Cuno, Ownership and Protection of Heritage: Cultural Property
st
Rights for the 21 Century: U.S. Art Museums and Cultural Property, 16
CONN . J. I NT ’ L L. 189, 195 (2001).
158
Andrea Cunning, U.S. Policy on the Enforcement of Foreign Export
Restrictions on Cultural Property & Destructive Aspects of Retention Schemes,
26 HOUS. J. I NT ’ L L. 449, 451 (2004).
156
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provide much practical assistance in encouraging voluntary
repatriation. Moreover, the relevant laws are characterized by
numerous flaws, including limitations on applicability, financial
burdens, ambiguous language, and a lack of uniformity in their
application. These obstacles “create[] uncertainty for museums,
true owners, and countries of origin.”159 Faced with virtually “no
meaningful legal remedy available to them as they consider how to
secure the return of their cultural heritage”160 and unable to evaluate
the strength of their prospective legal claims, claimant nations are
often compelled to enter into extrajudicial agreements.
At the same time, without the threat of being subject to a viable
cause of action, museums are ostensibly less inclined to voluntarily
repatriate disputed objects or to discontinue exploiting the
inadequacies of the current system by acquiring works of
questionable provenance. This subsection will examine the two
modern international conventions that pertain to the return of
cultural property looted and/or illicitly exported in peacetime—the
UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on
Stolen or Illegally Exported Objects (the “UNIDROIT
Convention”)—in order to show that flaws in the governing laws
ultimately bolster MBRAs, which, as already discussed, have the
potential to perpetuate the illicit antiquities trade.
1.

The UNESCO Convention

Widely considered the most significant international convention
today pertaining to cultural property,161 the UNESCO Convention
“views the repatriation of all archaeological artifacts as a moral
159

Kirby, supra note 28, at 734. See generally Evangelos I. Gegas,
International Arbitration and the Resolution of Cultural Property Disputes:
Navigating the Stormy Waters Surrounding Cultural Property, 13 OHIO ST . J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 129, 134 (1997) (explaining that national courts’
interpretations of the provisions of international conventions have differed).
160
Rudenstine, supra note 58, at 81.
161
The UNESCO Convention has more “depth” than the 1954 Hague
Convention because it covers cultural property beyond wartime and also has
more market nation signatories than the UNIDROIT Convention. Warring,
supra note 22, at 250.
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imperative,”162 and “tend[s] to favor . . . repatriation . . . under all
circumstances.”163 However, the UNESCO Convention has been
largely unsuccessful “in furthering the restitution of stolen works
of art,”164 and sadly, is “widely viewed as a weak, cumbersome,
and unenforceable jumble of rhetoric.”165
At the outset, the UNESCO Convention poses several hurdles
that may render it entirely ineffectual as a means of repatriation.
First, both parties involved in a cultural property dispute must be
members of the convention in order for its provisions to apply.
Although the UNESCO Convention boasts more signatories than
the UNIDROIT Convention, few of them are market nations. 166
Additionally, the UNESCO Convention only provides a public
right of action.167 Therefore, claims are dealt with on a state-tostate level, and private dispossessed owners are left without a
cause of action. Finally, the UNESCO Convention is of limited
utility because it is not retroactive.168 It only applies to material
stolen or illegally exported “after both the nation where the
162

Cohan, supra note 18, at 61.
Cunning, supra note 158, at 490.
164
Stephanie Doyal, Implementing the UNIDROIT Convention on Cultural
Property into Domestic Law: the Case of Italy, 39 COLUM . J. TRANSNAT ’ L L.
657, 665, 700 n.29 (2001) (explaining that only a few market nations have
ratified the UNESCO Convention, and the federal legislation in the United
States enacting it only implements two of its articles).
165
Kelly, supra note 19, at 44; see also Sherry, supra note 118, at 515
(“Since the UNESCO Convention’s adoption, a scholarly consensus has
emerged that the convention, although well-intentioned, has failed to provide the
effective protections envisioned by its framers.”).
166
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States are the only major
market nations that are state parties. UNESCO Legal Instruments,
http://www.unesco.org/ (follow “Legal Instruments” hyperlink; then follow
“Conventions” hyperlink; then follow “Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership
of Cultural Property 1970” hyperlink; then follow “States Parties” hyperlink)
(last visited Nov. 26, 2007).
167
UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the
Illicit Import, Export and Ownership of Cultural Property art. 7(b)(ii), Nov. 14,
1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 (1972), reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 289 (1971) [hereinafter
UNESCO Convention].
168
Chang, supra note 24, at 857.
163
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property is currently located and the nation from which the
property was stolen have adopted [the convention]”169 and enacted
implementing legislation.170 This creates a great hurdle for
repatriating nations. For example, despite being one of the first
nations to ratify the UNESCO Convention, the United States did
not become a member until 1983, when Congress enacted the
Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act (the
“CPIA”).171 Accordingly, a repatriating nation has no cause of
action against the United States under the UNESCO Convention
for any cultural property that was stolen and/or illegally exported
before 1983.
Additionally, the UNESCO Convention places a heavy
financial burden on claimant nations.172 Article 7(b)(ii) provides
that once a nation of origin requests the return of an object that was
illegally exported, the nation where the object is housed must
“take all the necessary steps to recover and return the object to the
requesting nation.”173 However, the requesting nation is required to
“furnish, at its expense[,] the documentation and other evidence
necessary to establish its claim for recovery and return” and is
obliged to “pay just compensation to an innocent purchaser or to a
person who has valid title to that property.”174 Furthermore, the
claimant nation must bear “all expenses incident to the return and
delivery of [the] property.”175 In the aggregate, these sums can be
substantial, particularly since the UNESCO Convention does not
provide any guidance insofar as what constitutes just
compensation. As a result, claimant nations with limited funds are
confronted with the intimidating prospect that the enforcing court
will interpret the clause to require them to provide compensation
beyond their means.
169

William H. Kenety, Who Owns the Past? The Need for Legal Reform
and Reciprocity in the International Art Trade, 23 CORNELL INT ’ L L.J. 1, 10
(1990).
170
Greenfield, supra note 17, at 188.
171
Cunning, supra note 158, at 470; 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–13.
172
Kirby, supra note 28, at 735.
173
Kirby, supra note 28, at 735.
174
UNESCO Convention, supra note 167.
175
UNESCO Convention, supra note 167.
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Even when these initial limitations are not entirely prohibitive,
source nations may still be deterred from bringing their repatriation
claims under the UNESCO Convention because its ambiguous
language leaves unclear what works are covered and “promotes
inconsistency . . . in the courtroom where it is subject to judicial
interpretation.”176
Two of the most significant examples of the UNESCO
Convention’s vagueness can be found in Articles 1 and 7. Article 1
provides an inclusive list of what constitutes “cultural property,”
and the section explicitly states that the term encompasses
“products of archaeological excavations (including regular or
clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries,” and “antiquities more
than one hundred years old.”177 The list, however, is prefaced by a
clause defining cultural property as that which has been
“specifically designated by each State as being of importance.”178
Accordingly, even where the cultural property at issue has been
stolen and exported illegally, so long as the claimant nation failed to
ever document its specific existence, the UNESCO Convention
does not impose an obligation on state parties to recover and return
it. 179
Additionally, the application of Article 7, which provides for
repatriation, is unclear as to artifacts plundered from archaeological
sites. 180 Article 7 only states that coverage extends to inventoried
cultural property stolen from museums or religious or secular
public monuments or similar institutions.181 In sum, “proving that
an undiscovered object falls within the UNESCO Convention’s
definition [of cultural property] and that the convention should
govern poses an uphill [and often dispositive] battle for a nation
petitioning for the repatriation of the looted object.”182
Finally, although signatories to the UNESCO Convention agree
176

Claudia Fox, The Unidroit Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported
Objects, 29 AM . U.J. I NT ’ L L. & P OL ’ Y 225, 251 (1993).
177
UNESCO Convention, supra note 167, at art. 1.
178
UNESCO Convention, supra note 167, at art. 1.
179
Cohan, supra note 18, at 50.
180
Cohan, supra note 18, at 6.
181
UNESCO Convention, supra note 167, at art. 7.
182
Chang, supra note 24, at 841.
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to cooperate and act in a timely manner in returning cultural
property, 183 the CPIA imposes detailed statutes of limitations that
greatly diminish its utility in the United States. Essentially, the
sub-clauses of 19 U.S.C.A. § 2611(2)184 extinguish source nations’
causes of actions in any of four situations, which take into account
the following factors: the number of years that the museum has
possessed the object, whether the museum was a bona fide
purchaser, whether the museum publicized the object, and, if so,
how recently, and whether the claimant party knew or should have
known of the object’s location.185 These statutes of limitations
each provide a notice requirement, but fail to acknowledge the
complex evidentiary burdens that the UNESCO Convention may
impose on claimant nations. Even if a source nation is aware of the
location and possessor of its cultural property, it may take several
years for it to accumulate sufficient evidence to bring a repatriation
claim, by which time a subdivision of § 2611(2) may render the
cultural property exempt.186 In many situations, the statute forces
a source nation seeking to repatriate its cultural property to choose
183
184

UNESCO Convention, supra note 167, at art. 13(b) & (c).
Convention on Cultural Property Act, 19 U.S.C.S. § 2611(2)(A)-(D)

(1983).
185

Ashton Hawkins, Richard A. Rothman & David B. Goldstein, A Tale
of Two Innocents, 64 FORDHAM L. REV . 49, 83–84 (1995). Specifically, the
statutes of limitation have run: (1) when the object has been held for at least
three years by a museum or similar institution in the United States that
purchased it in good faith, reported the acquisition in certain publications,
displayed it to the public for at least one year, and made it available to the
public for a minimum of two years; (2) when the object has been held for at least
ten consecutive years and been publicly exhibited for at least five; (3) when the
object has been held for at least ten consecutive years and the claimant party
received or should have received notice of its whereabouts; and (4) when the
object has been held for at least twenty consecutive years and the possessor can
prove that it was a bona fide purchase. Convention on Cultural Property Act, 19
U.S.C.S. § 2611(2)(A)-(D).
186
For example, Italian authorities became aware that the Met had the
Morgantina Collection in its possession as early as 1987. Slayman, supra note
4. Nevertheless, it was not until nine years later that the Italian government felt
it had sufficient proof of the works’ origins that it started to make appeals to the
Met, and it was only after certain evidence was discovered in 2005 that the
museum became willing to enter into talks with Italy. Id.
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between bringing its claim prematurely, or losing its cause of action
altogether.
Notwithstanding the gravity of these flaws, it is imperative that
the UNESCO Convention is utilized by claimant nations to
judicially delineate its meaning. As enforcing courts interpret the
UNESCO Convention, it will become more clear how just
compensation should be calculated, the degree of detail that is
needed for the specific designation requirement to be met, and the
quantum of proof that a claimant nation must provide in order to
prevail. With this information at their disposal, source nations will
likely be able to better comprehend and weigh the relative merits of
their repatriation options. At the same time, litigation under the
UNESCO Convention will become a viable threat, thereby
deterring institutions and private collectors that finance the illicit
antiquities market from continuing to purchase works of
questionable provenance. Only when both sides are supplied with
equal information and knowledge will entrance into MBRAs truly
be a desirable alternative to litigation.
2.

The UNIDROIT Convention

Twenty-five years after UNESCO Convention was passed,
UNESCO requested that the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law draft the UNIDROIT Convention187 in
order “to establish a new [complementary] framework to govern
the restitution of stolen cultural objects.”188 Credited as being the
most “restitution centered”189 of the conventions, the UNIDROIT
Convention “fight[s] against the illicit trade of cultural objects by
establishing common, minimal rules for the return and restitution of
cultural objects between contracting states.”190 However, bringing a
claim pursuant to the UNIDROIT Convention was not a viable

187

Warring, supra note 22, at 252.
Fox, supra note 176, at 256.
189
Warring, supra note 22, at 291–92.
190
Emily A. Maples, Holocaust Art: It Isn’t Always “Finders Keepers,
Losers Weepers”: A Look at Art Stolen During the Third Reich, 9 T ULSA J.
COMP. & I NT ’ L L. 355, 373 (2001).
188
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alternative for the claimant nations that reached MBRAs with
American museums earlier this year because the United States,
along with other major market nations,191 has neither signed nor
ratified the Convention.192 Even if the United States were to do so,
these nations would likely still be inclined to enter into MBRAs
rather than face the various obstacles and vague language currently
presented by the UNIDROIT Convention.
At first read, the UNIDROIT Convention appears to address
several of the UNESCO Convention’s fundamental flaws. Unlike
the UNESCO Convention, Chapter II of the UNIDROIT
Convention provides for a private right of action, enabling parties
other than states to bring their claims.193 Moreover, although the
UNIDROIT Convention adopts the same definition of cultural
property as the UNESCO Convention, it does not require states to
specifically designate cultural property in order for it to be
protected.194 Yet despite its superficially uncompromising nature,
the UNIDROIT Convention is heavily qualified by its various
provisions pertaining to repatriation, limitations, and
compensation.
First, Article 4(1) of the UNIDROIT Convention clearly
provides that “[t]he possessor of a stolen cultural object [shall be]
require[d] to return it.”195 But this unequivocal language only
extends to property that is either “unlawfully excavated or
191

Chang, supra note 24, at 859 (noting that the UNIDROIT Convention
lacks impact because it lacks participation of major market nations such as the
U.S., the U.K., and Japan).
192
That is, the United States was not a signatory to the UNIDROIT
Convention and did not enact implementing legislation. Sherry, supra note
118, at 517.
193
Palmer, supra note 16, at 16. Contra Kathleen Andersen, The
International Theft and Illegal Export of Cultural Property, 8 N EW ENG . I NT’ L
& COMP. L. A NN. 411, 428 (2002) (noting that, in actuality, the process for the
restitution of illegally-exported cultural property in Chapter III very closely
resembles public law).
194
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Objects art.
3(2), June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322, available at http://www.unidroit.org/
english/conventions/1995culturalproperty/1995culturalproperty-e.htm [hereinafter
UNIDROIT Convention].
195
Id. at art. 4(1).
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lawfully excavated but unlawfully retained.”196 The repatriation of
illegally exported cultural property is addressed separately under
Article 5, which imposes a heightened burden on the claimant state:
The court or other competent authority of the State
addressed shall order the return of an illegally exported
cultural object if the requesting State establishes that the
removal of the object from its territory significantly impairs
one or more of the following interests: (a) the physical
Preservation of the object or of its context; (b) the integrity
of a complex object; (c) the preservation of information . . .
; (d) the traditional or ritual use of the object by a tribal or
indigenous community, or . . . that the object is of
significant cultural importance for the requesting State.197
The text does not, however, define what constitutes “significant
impairment,” but rather, leaves the issue entirely within the
discretion of the enforcing court. As such, until a substantial
amount of case law has interpreted the term of art, claimant nations
will have little information from which to gage whether they will be
able to meet this standard.
Insofar as the statutes of limitations, the UNIDROIT
Convention’s are more complex than those of the UNESCO
Convention. Article 3 creates a tri-part system: Pursuant to Article
3(3), “[a]ny claim for restitution [must] be brought within a period
of three years from the time when the claimant knew the location
of the cultural object and the identity of its possessor, and in any
case[,] within a period of fifty years from the time of the theft.”198
However, Articles 3(4) and 3(5) carve out two major exceptions to
this temporal framework. Notwithstanding Article 3(3), restitution
claims pertaining to works “forming an integral part of an identified
monument or archaeological site, or belonging to a public collection,
shall not be subject to time limitations other than a period of three
years from the time when the claimant knew the location of the
cultural object and the identity of its possessor,”199 and “any
196
197
198
199

Id. at art. 3(2).
Id. at art. 5(3) (emphasis added).
Id. at art. 3(3).
UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 194, at art. 3(4).
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Contracting State may declare that a claim is subject to a time
limitation of 75 years or such longer period as is provided in its
law.”200 In addition to the aforementioned evidentiary
requirements, these temporal requirements can amount to heavy,
and at times, defeatist burdens.
Moreover, pursuant to Article 4 of the UNIDROIT
Convention, claimant nations are required to provide “fair and
reasonable compensation” to the possessor party, so long as the
“possessor neither knew nor ought reasonably to have known that
the object was stolen [or illegally exported],” and the possessor
“can prove that it exercised due diligence when acquiring the
object.”201 Article 4(2) attempts to hold dealers responsible for this
compensation, stating that “reasonable efforts shall be made to
have the person who transferred the cultural object to the
possessor” be liable.202 Realistically, however, Articles 4(1) and
6(1)203 closely resemble the compensation provision of the
UNESCO Convention. In effect, the UNIDROIT Convention
“grant[s] [the original owner] an option to repurchase the
artwork.”204
The compensation provisions of the UNIDROIT Convention
also resemble those of the UNESCO Convention in that they are
plagued by vague terms and phrases. 205 The UNIDROIT
200

UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 194, at art. 3(5).
The due diligence requirement only applies in cases involving stolen
property. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 194, at arts. 4(1), 6(1).
202
UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 194, at art. 4(2).
203
UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 194, at arts. 4(1), 6(1) (Article 4(1)
provides that “[t]he possessor of a stolen cultural object required to return it
shall be entitled, at the time of its restitution, to payment of fair and reasonable
compensation provided that the possessor neither knew nor ought reasonably to
have known that the object was stolen and can prove that it exercised due
diligence when acquiring the object.” Article 6(1) provides that “[t]he possessor
of a cultural object who acquired the object after it was illegally exported shall
be entitled, at the time of its return, to payment by the requesting State of fair
and reason [sic] compensation, provided that the possessor neither knew nor
ought reasonably to have known at the time of acquisition that the object had
been illegally exported.”).
204
Grover, supra note 30, at 1455.
205
Gegas, supra note 159, at 145–47.
201
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Convention recognizes that its terms and provisions must be
judicially interpreted by each Contracting Party’s national
courts.206 Most prominently, what constitutes reasonable
compensation is never explained, but rather, is left entirely to the
discretion of the state litigating the case.207 The resulting
uncertainty is exacerbated by the fact that common law and civil
law nations may be prone to “interpreting the same provisions in
much different manners”208 because common law courts adhere to
the nemo dat rule that a thief cannot convey valid title209 and
because civil law courts favor the bona fide purchaser over the
dispossessed original owner.210 As such, a common law court might
be inclined to find, under its national laws, that no compensation
need be provided,211 whereas a civil law court might require the
claimant nation to compensate the possessor for the full purchase
price.212 Similarly, civil and common law courts may reach
disparate conclusions as to whether the possessor exercised due
diligence213 because the UNIDROIT Convention does not specify
the weight to be afforded to the factors that constitute due diligence
or whether the list is exhaustive.214
206

Gegas, supra note 159, at 148.
Gegas, supra note 159, at 148–49.
208
Gegas, supra note 159, at 148–49; see UNIDROIT Convention, supra
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any reasonably accessible register of stolen cultural objects, and any
other relevant information and documentation which it could reasonably
have obtained, and whether the possessor consulted accessible agencies
or took any other step that a reasonable person would have taken in the
circumstances.
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As the UNIDROIT Convention now stands, its application
and interpretation are dependent upon the jurisdiction in which it is
being invoked.215 Accordingly, as with the UNESCO Convention,
repatriation claims must be brought pursuant to the UNIDROIT
Convention in order for “[c]rucial issues, standards and terms . . .
to be clarified by judicial interpretation.”216 As cases are brought
and decisions are handed down, what tends to constitute
“significant impairment” and “fair and reasonable compensation”
will become evident, and source nations will be in a better position
to evaluate the strength of their legal claims. Until such case law is
on the books, however, MBRAs will detract from the formation of
such precedent, leaving claimant nations in pursuit of a legal
remedy with burdens that are simultaneously intimidating and
unclear.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the diversity of views within the repatriation
discourse, few would dispute that repatriation provides a remedy
to minimize the damage caused by the illicit antiquities trade and
that it is necessary to curb its existence. But as a variation of pure
repatriation, MBRAs have the counter effect. By padding the
corresponding risks and possible losses, MBRAs encourage
museums and other institutions to continue to acquire works of
questionable provenance. At the same time, MBRAs detract from
the formation of much-needed judicial precedent interpreting
international conventions that would better inform source nations
as to the strengths of their prospective legal claims and render
MBRAs a genuine alternative.
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